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EXPANDING NEW YORK'S DNA DATABASE:
THE FUTURE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT
Robert W. Schumacher II*
Introduction
On a December morning in New York City, a young girl is found
by authorities, sexually molested and murdered. There is no evi-
dence present at the crime scene to produce a suspect. The victim's
friends and family are questioned, but no one is able to provide any
leads. As the investigation continues, however, lab reports un-
cover semen samples from the victim's body. With today's technol-
ogy, such evidence can be run through New York State's
deoxyribonucleic acid ("DNA") database, with the hope of finding
a match between the semen found on the victim's body and a sam-
ple already existing in the database. Currently, this database con-
tains DNA profiles from those previously convicted of certain sex
offenses, homicide, assault and escape.'
Unfortunately, the crime scene sample does not match any re-
corded in the database. The killer murders four more girls in the
same way before being captured in the act with victim number six.
Upon detention, it is discovered that the killer had been con-
victed of two misdemeanors in New York State within the last year-
Sexual Misconduct and Reckless Endangerment in the Second De-
gree. Had New York's compulsory DNA statute been more expan-
sive to mandate samples from all those arrested for fingerprintable
offenses, the initial sample collected would have matched this
man's DNA profile. The lives of five young girls could have been
spared.
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2000; B.A., magna cum
laude, Villanova University, 1997. I would like to extend my appreciation to Profes-
sor Daniel Richman for his valuable insight and advice. I also wish to thank my par-
ents, Robert Sr. and Rosemary, and sister, Melanie, for their steadfast love, support
and encouragement.
1. See N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 995 (McKinney 1994). Specifically, felons are required
to submit a DNA sample when convicted of an assault under N.Y. PENAL LAW sec-
tions 120.05, 120.10 and 120.11, a homicide under sections 125.15-125.27 or a sex of-
fense under sections 130.25, 130.30, 130.35, 130.40, 130.45, 130.50, 130.65, 130.67,
130.70 and 255.25. See id. § 995.7. Also, submission is required when a felon is con-
victed under sections 205.10, 205.15, 205.17 and 205.19 relating to escape and other
offenses, where the offender has been convicted within the previous five years of one
of the other felonies enumerated. See id.
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This Note analyzes New York City Police Commissioner Howard
Safir's ("Safir") proposal to expand New York's DNA Database to
include profiles from all persons arrested for a recordable offense.
Part I discusses the admissibility of DNA identification technology
in New York courts and gives an overview of the molecular biology
of DNA, explaining the powerful investigative advantage of DNA
and the main profiling methods available. In addition, Part I de-
scribes other DNA database programs currently in place and con-
cludes with a detailed outline of Safir's proposal. Part II defines
the controversy surrounding Safir's proposal, specifically Fourth
Amendment privacy concerns, as well as fears of potential misuse
of DNA profile information stored in a computer database. Part
III addresses these concerns and details New York's specific need
for an expanded statute in light of New York's recidivism rates,
recent crime trends, investigative efficiency and lower administra-
tive costs. This Note concludes that Safir's plan is an effective, cut-
ting-edge law enforcement tool that does not overly intrude upon
an individual's Fourth Amendment privacy rights.
I. Overview of DNA Uses
DNA identification techniques are capable of assisting law en-
forcement officials in implicating the guilty and exonerating the in-
nocent.' In the early 1990s, New York State recognized these
inherent benefits and began admitting the probative evidence in
judicial proceedings.
2. Despite these apparent benefits in criminal prosecutions, opponents to the
processes of DNA identification cite two main arguments against the admissibility of
findings in criminal proceedings. First, because DNA profiling is a long complex pro-
cess, opponents attack relaxed testing protocols that could lead to error. See ROBERT
J. GOODWIN & JIMMY GURULE, CRIMINAL AND SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 285 (1997).
Specifically, results are unreliable when mislabeling, contamination and comparison
negligence occurs. See id. One illustration of the call for quality control and profi-
ciency standards in laboratory DNA testing can be found in New York v. Castro, 545
N.Y.S.2d 985, 997-98 (Sup. Ct. 1989), where the court held DNA evidence in-
admissable because those testing the sample failed to follow appropriate standards
and controls.
Second, critics attack the accuracy of probability estimates concerning the chances
of another person having a similar genetic make-up as the accused. See id. The
probability figures, usually in the one-in-several million range, if wrongfully calcu-
lated, are "unreliable, misleading, and highly prejudicial." Id.
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In 1994, in People v. Wesley,3 the New York Court of Appeals
found Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism ("RFLP") 4 pro-
filing admissible in New York State. The court ruled that the
RFLP profiling method is generally accepted as reliable in the sci-
entific community,6 using a test for admissibility of novel scientific
evidence similar to that in Frye v. United States.7 The majority de-
cision noted that questions of procedural negligence and
probability inaccuracy were irrelevant to the issue of admissibility,
but instead, were matters for jury consideration.8
Seven months after Wesley, a New York trial court held that
Polymerse Chain Reaction ("PCR") 9 profiling techniques were
generally admissible in criminal proceedings in People v.
Palumbo."° Relying on universal acceptaoce in other jurisdic-
tions,1 the Palumbo court found the PCR test to be "generally ac-
3. 633 N.E.2d 451 (1994). This case involved the murder of seventy-nine year-old
Helen Kendrick. See id. at 453. The investigation of her death led to Wesley when a
bloodstained T-shirt with gray and white hairs on it, bloodstained underwear and
bloodstained sweatpants were found in the defendant's apartment. See id. DNA
comparisons provided inculpatory evidence, though the defendant was linked to the
crime through a number of incriminating statements and nylon from Wesley's carpet
found on the deceased's dress. See id. Wesley questioned whether DNA profiling
evidence was admissible in New York and, if so, whether it should have been admitted
against him. See id. at 452.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 29-52.
5. See Wesley, 633 N.E.2d at 455.
6. See id.
7. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The rule of Frye is that scientific expert testi-
mony is admissible only after the espoused theory has gained general acceptance in
the scientific field. See id. at 1014. Specifically, the Frye court stated:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the ex-
perimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this
twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and
while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a
well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the
deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
Id. The Wesley court felt Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579
(1993), which held that Frye was superseded by the Federal Rules of Evidence, was
inapplicable here. See Wesley, 633 N.E.2d at 454 n.2.
8. See id. 457-58. In concurrence, Chief Judge Kaye disputed the finding that
RFLP was a reliable scientific technique in 1988, when conducted against Wesley. See
id. at 463 (Kaye, J., concurring).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 53-70.
10. 618 N.Y.S.2d 197 (Sup. Ct. 1994). In a second-degree murder proceeding, the
defendant requested a determination on the admissibility of a DNA profile taken
using the PCR profiling method. See id. at 198.
11. See id. at 200-01 (citing Oregon v. Lyons, 863 P.2d 1303 (Or. Ct. App. 1993);
Clarke v. Texas, 813 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991); Spencer v. Virginia, 393 S.E.2d
609 (1990); Washington v. Russell, 882 P.2d 747 (1994)).
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cepted as reliable in the scientific community."12 The Palumbo
court further addressed opponents' concerns regarding probability
issues in stating "[t]hat the PCR test may only show that the de-
fendant and the assailant are part of a relatively large group of
people having the same characteristic goes to weight of the evi-
dence, not its admissibility."' 3
While generally admissible in New York State, however, DNA
evidence still generates heated debate, specifically over its use as
an identification tool in conjunction with technological revolutions.
In order for one to fully understand the relevant issues being
raised, an overview of DNA science and profiling techniques is
necessary.
A. Molecular Biology of DNA
DNA is the fundamental material that defines the genetic char-
acteristics of all life forms. 14 DNA is present in most body cells,
specifically those with nuclei, and can be carried in bodily fluids
such as saliva, blood or semen.'5 DNA sequences vary in length
and are composed of four organic bases, namely adenine ("A"),
cytosine ("C"), thymine ("T") and guanine ("G"), arranged in long
chains that form a double helix.' 6 Essentially, the structure resem-
bles a twisted ladder.' 7 The sides of the ladder consist of repeated
sequences of phosphate and deoxyribose sugar.' 8 The rungs of the
ladder are formed by pairs of the aforementioned bases.' 9 A single
DNA molecule consists of over three billion base pairs where A
matches only with T, while C exclusively pairs with G.2 ° Thus, if a
section of bases on one side of the ladder is ATTACAGGC, the
opposite side would be TAATGTCCG.2 '
12. Palumbo, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 201.
13. Id.
14. See BRUCE ALBERTS ET AL., Glossary in MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE CELL
G-8 (3d ed. 1994) (defining DNA as "serv[ing] as the carrier of genetic information").
15. See BRUCE ALBERTS ET AL., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE CELL 385 (2d ed.
1983); People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 988 (Sup. Ct. 1989) (detailing the scientific
background behind the theory of DNA identification). Red blood cells, for instance,
which do not have nuclei, do not carry DNA. See Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 988. Also,
DNA may be recoverable from other tissue through a cell's mitochondria. See Barry
Scheck, Privacy: The Impact of DNA Databases 33 (March 2, 1999) (transcript on file
with Fordham Urban Law Journal) [hereinafter Scheck Transcript].
16. See ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 15, at 99.
17. See People v. Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643, 646 (Albany County Ct. 1988).
18. See Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 988.
19. See id.
20. See Louis LEVINE, BIOLOGY OF THE GENE 11 (1969).
21. See id.
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Over ninety-nine percent of the base pairs described are the
same in all humans, responsible for a human's inherent form.22
The remaining base pairs, however, vary from person to person,23
accounting for physical differences among humans that make each
24person unique.
B. DNA Profiling25
DNA profiling technology provides law enforcement officials
with a means of identifying individuals by detecting differences in
cell structure.26 DNA profiling involves three basic steps:
(i) an analysis of both the known sample (taken from the sus-
pect) and the unknown sample (recovered from the crime
scene) to derive a series of DNA patterns present in each; (ii) a
comparison of these profiles to determine if there is a match
(indicating that an identity of source is possible) or an exclusion
(indicating that such identity is unlikely); and (iii) if there is a
match, a statistical analysis to determine what proportion of per-
sons in the same population as the suspect have the same DNA
patterns. 27
22. See Judith A. McKenna et al., Reference Guide on Forensic DNA Evidence, in
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENIFIC EVIDENCE 273, 281 (1994); KEITH INMAN & No-
RAH RUDIN, AN INTRODUCTION TO FORENSIC DNA ANALYSIS 29 (1997).
23. While DNA is unique to each individual, identical twins, with the same genetic
make-up, will posses identical DNA. See McKenna et al., supra note 22, at 281.
24. See id. Within a cell's nucleus, DNA is apportioned into forty-six sections
called chromosomes. See SIMON EASTEAL ET AL., DNA PROFILING: PRINCIPLES PIT-
FALLS AND POTENTIAL 9 (1991). The ordinary human cell contains twenty-three pairs
of matching chromosomes, one chromosome per pair inherited from each parent. See
id. Each human cell actually contains the same twenty-two pairs of chromosomes and
a pair of sex chromosomes (male cells contain X and Y chromosomes, while female
cells contain two X chromosomes). See id. The portion of DNA involved in produc-
ing certain physical traits is called a gene. See McKenna et al., supra note 22, at 281.
Genes are located at specific sites, or loci, upon certain chromosomes. Alternate
forms of genes are known as alleles. See id. at 282. Alleles have a dramatic impact on
cells, accounting for variant physical expression among humans. See EASTEAL ET AL.,
supra note 24, at 12. A locus where the allele differ among humans is called
"polymorphic, and the difference is known as polymorphism." Mckenna et al., supra
note 22, at 282.
25. In 1984, Alec Jeffreys discovered a unique application of technology for
personal identification purposes. See INMAN & RUDIN, supra note 22, at 19. He
termed the method "DNA fingerprinting," but scientists generally agree a better term
for the process is "DNA typing" or "DNA profiling." See id.
26. See Mira Gur-Arie, The Science of DNA Profiling, in NEW YORK'S DNA
DATABANK AND COMMISSION ON FORENSIC SCIENCE, AN ANALYSIS OF CHAPTER 737
OF THE LAWS OF 1994, INCLUDING THE COMPLETE TEXT OF THE NEW STATUTORY
PROVISIONS 16 (1994) [hereinafter COMMISSION ANALYSIS].
27. Id. at 17 (citing NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN Fo-
RENSIC SCIENCE 51 (1992); Bruce S. Weir, Population Genetics in the Forensic DNA
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Identifying individuals for law enforcement purposes can be ac-
complished by utilizing one of several methods for comparing ge-
netic variation.28
1. RFLP Analysis
RFLP analysis determines the size of a repetitive sequence of
base pairs.29 "Because the length of these sequences (sometimes
called band size) of base pairs [can vary greatly] ... comparison of
several corresponding sequences of DNA from known (suspect)
and unknown [crime scene] sources gives information about
whether the two samples are from the same source. "30
In the first step of RFLP analysis, DNA is separated from a sam-
ple of cells through the use of a centrifuge. 31 After extraction, the
DNA is cleaned with organic solutions and divided into fragments
with restriction enzymes.32 Through a procedure called "agarose
gel electrophoresis," the fragments are then separated by length
and placed adjacent to a positive electrode in a container full of
agarose gel.33 Electric current is applied to the sample, causing
DNA fragments to separate by length.34
After electrophoresis, the resulting DNA fragments are trans-
ferred from the gel to a nylon membrane, through a process called
"Southern Blotting. ' ' 35 The DNA is then unzipped by "heating
[and] separating the double helix into single strands[,] ' '36 exposing
Debate, 89 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. ScI. 11, 654 (1992)); see also Arizona v. Bible, 858
P.2d 1152, 1180 (Sup. Ct. 1993).
28. See COMMISSION ANALYSIS, supra note 26, at 17.
29. See M. KRAWCZAK & J. SCHMIDTKE, DNA FINGERPRINTING 27 (1994). Base
pair sequences consistently repeat. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EVALU-
ATION OF FORENSIC SCIENCE 14 (1996). The repetitive sequences are known as Varia-
ble Number of Tandem Repeats. See id.
30. McKenna et al., supra note 22, at 282.
31. See DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, FORENSIC DNA ANALYSIS: ISSUES 5
(1991) [hereinafter DEPARTMENT ANALYSIS]. A centrifuge is "a machine [used] for
whirling fluids rapidly to separate substances of different densities by centrifugal
force." WEBSTER'S TIIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 363 (1986).
32. Restriction enzymes are virtual scissors used to cut DNA chains at specific
sites. This stage is known as restriction digestion. See COMMISSION ANALYSIS, supra
note 26, at 18.
33. See id. Agarose Gel is a "gelatin-like material solidified in a slab about five
inches thick." McKenna et al., supra note 22, at 282.
34. See COMMISSION ANALYSIS, supra note 26, at 18. DNA carries a negative
charge and will, when electrocuted, move toward the positive electrode. See DEPART-
MENT ANALYSIS, supra note 31, at 5. The distance a single DNA fragment travels
depends on its length, as shorter fragments travel farther than longer, heavier frag-
ments. See id.
35. See DEPARTMENT ANALYSIS, supra note 31, at 5.
36. McKenna et al., supra note 22, at 282.
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the A, T, C and G base blocks.37 Next, the unzipped fragments are
exposed to radioactive probes,38 "designed to be attracted only to
polymorphic DNA segments, those that vary somewhat among
individuals. 39
The radioactivity of the probes allows for visual tracking via X-
rays.40 When film is developed, bands called "autorads" are visi-
ble, representing an actual print of DNA band patterns.41 The final
stage of RFLP analysis involves band pattern comparison.42 "Ge-
netic differences between individuals will be identified by differ-
ences in the location and distribution of the band patterns, which
correspond to the length of the DNA fragments present."43 If two
samples are from the same source, "hybridized DNA fragments of
approximately the same length should appear at the same point in
the suspect and evidence specimen[s]. '44 This procedure, there-
fore, is not an actual comparison of genetic code, but is instead a
measure of length of DNA fragments at a particular site on the
DNA chain.45
RFLP analysis is a useful technique because it is capable of dis-
criminating between samples.46 If at different markers there is
band consistency, a high probability47 exists that the DNA came
37. See DEPARTMENT ANALYSIS, supra note 31, at 5.
38. The probes are laboratory developed fragments carrying radioactive markers.
See id. Each probe seeks out a matching sequence and binds to the complimentary
strands. See id.
39. COMMISSION ANALYSIS, supra note 26, at 18. This process is known as "hy-
bridization." Id. The probes will seek out sequences with which they match and at-
tach themselves to the strand. See DEPARTMENT ANALYSIS, supra note 31, at 5.
Therefore, a strand of "ATrGCA, for example, will bind with TAACGT." Id. at 6.
40. See DEPARTMENT ANALYSIS, supra note 31, at 6.
41. See COMMISSION ANALYSIS, supra note 26, at 18. This image of bars is a com-
parable configuration to that found on a supermarket bar code. See INMAN & RUDIN,
supra note 22, at 65.
42. The autorads can be compared either visually or by computer. See COMMIS-
SION ANALYSIS, supra note 26, at 18. Machine comparison converts the bar pattern
into numeric code for purposes of analysis. See id.
43. DEPARTMENT ANALYSIS, supra note 31, at 6.
44. McKenna et al., supra note 22, at 283.
45. See COMMISSION ANALYSIS, supra note 26, at 18. Each fragment tends to vary
in length among individuals. See id. While no single fragment is unique, an identical
combination of lengths is extremely rare. See id. When a match is made, therefore,
an estimate of the "frequency with which such a set of fragment length patterns is
likely to appear in a given population[ ]" is necessary to evaluate the significance of
the match. Id. at 18-19.
46. See Scheck Transcript, supra note 15, at 27.
47. A five marker match would indicate that the same pattern could only be found
in one-in-ten to one hundred million individuals. See id. at 27.
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from the same source, thereby identifying a suspect.48 Moreover,
matching more bands increases the discrimination power of the
analysis.4 9 Conversely, inconsistency at markers is dispositive that
the suspect should be excluded.5°
One potential drawback to RFLP analysis is that a sufficient
sample size is required to initiate the process. 1 Similarly, older
samples cannot be utilized via this process because bacteria eats
away at the DNA sample, rendering it useless for identification
purposes.52
2. PCR Technique
PCR is another effective identification technique available when
there is an insufficient amount of DNA for RFLP analysis.53 Es-
sentially, the process replicates a minuscule DNA sample to enable
genetic analysis.54
The first step, called denaturation, involves separating the two
strands of the double helix so each can be used to generate a new
strand.55 Next, DNA primers56 are used to establish a foundation
on which DNA can replicate.5 1 The primers must have a compli-
mentary sequence of bases to the sample so that synthesis is possi-
ble. 8 An enzyme is applied to the sample, causing the primers to
synthesize with their complimentary strands.5 9 This process is per-
formed over and over, resulting in millions of copies of DNA iden-
48. See id. A commonly misunderstood point is that a DNA match via RFLP is
not a declaration that a defendant is the source of the specimen tested. See COMMIS-
SION ANALYSIS, supra note 26, at 19. Rather, the match of a DNA profile is merely an
estimate of the frequency "with which this particular pattern of fragment lengths is
likely to occur in the defendant's relevant ethnic population." Id.
49. See Scheck Transcript, supra note 15, at 27.
50. See id. at 28.
51. See INMAN & RUDIN, supra note 22, at 69.
52. See Scheck Transcript, supra note 15, at 28.
53. See DEPARTMENT ANALYSIS, supra note 31, at 6. Another benefit of using this
technique compared to RFLP is that one sample can be tested several times. See
Scheck Transcript, supra note 15, at 30. Comparatively, RFLP analysis usually only
permits but one test if a limited sample is present. See id. at 28.
54. See EASTEAL ET AL., supra note 24, at 129.
55. See INMAN & RUDIN, supra note 22, at 69. Separating the double helix re-
quires heating the sample to 94°C. See EASTEAL ET AL., supra note 24, at 129.
56. Primers are "short synthetic pieces of DNA that match defined locations by
complimentary base pairing." INMAN & RUDIN, supra note 22, at 70.
57. See DEPARTMENT ANALYSIS, supra note 31, at 6.
58. See id.
59. See id.
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tical to the original sample.60 Finally, DNA is placed in a filter to
evaluate the amplified sample.61
One manner of analysis is the DQ Alpha technique. Under this
process, the amplified DNA sample is placed over strips of probes
containing DNA segments corresponding to a base known to exist
at the studied site.62 A reagent is then applied that produces
colored dots to appear where binding is successful between the am-
plified DNA and the probe DNA, confirming the presence of
targeted alleles.63 Because a high percentage of the population
may carry a given allele,64 the analysis must be completed several
times at different loci to narrow the percentage of people that
could carry the fragments present in the DNA sample. 65 The prob-
lem with this technique, therefore, is its lack of discrimination, rais-
ing concerns over a coincidental match.66
Another analytic technique is the D1S80 method. Similar to
RFLP, D1S80 analyzes the variation present at a given locus of a
defined DNA fragment.67 However, because the sample size is
small, it is amplified using PCR.68 Like RFLP, D1S80 distinguishes
the sample manually using a chart resembling a supermarket
barcode. 69 Because only a limited number of loci are analyzed
under this system, the power of discrimination is not as great as
that of RFLP.7 °
3. Mitochondrial DNA
While both the RFLP and PCR methods analyze genetic mate-
rial residing within a cell's nucleus, other bits of genetic material
60. The process is also known as "molecular Xeroxing" because of this duplication
effect. See INMAN & RUDIN, supra note 22, at 70.
61. See People v. Lee, 537 N.W.2d 233, 251 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
62. See INMAN & RUDIN, supra note 22, at 70-71.
63. This comparison process is therefore known as "reverse-dot blot procedure or
the blue-dot procedure." Lee, 537 N.W.2d at 251.
64. At any given locus, for example, there may be alleles resulting merely in
brown or green eyes. See DEPARTMENT ANALYSIS, supra note 31, at 6.
65. See id.
66. This method guarantees only that one of every 5000 individuals will posses this
genetic make-up. See Scheck Transcript, supra note 15, at 31.
67. See INMAN & RUDIN, supra note 22, at 47.
68. However, unlike RFLP, the power of discrimination is limited because usually
only one locus is analyzed. See id.
69. See id. Another comparison method, Short Tandem Repeats (STR) is strik-
ingly similar to the D1S80 system, except repeat units are shorter. See id. at 48.
70. Also, the significance of the test may be further reduced if it analyzes alleles
common among individuals in particular racial groups. See id. at 47.
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exist in a cell's mitochondria.71 The main advantage of analyzing
mitochondrial DNA ("mDNA") is that it is available in hair and
bone, materials that would prove useless with other testing tech-
niques.72 However, discrimination is a substantial problem because
mDNA, transmitted maternally, is identical in siblings and between
mother and child.73
C. DNA Databases
DNA evidence has limited use as an identification tool without
the utilization of a computer database. 4 A DNA database is a
computerized collection of DNA profiles capable of being used for
criminal identification purposes.75 DNA profiles are ideal for such
storage because the information can be stored in numeric code,
thereby requiring minimal technology.76 Essentially, a DNA test
result derived from a crime scene sample can be checked against
the digital profiles stored in the database.77 Any matches made
with database profiles can then be used as probable cause to obtain
a sample from a suspect for further testing.78 This procedure
guards against sampling errors that could have occurred during
data entry.79
71. Mitochondria are subcellular compartments or organelles that supply power to
the cell. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 29, at 72.
72. See Scheck Transcript, supra note 15, at 34.
73. See EASTEAL ET AL., supra note 24, at 136.
74. Without the use of random DNA profiles to check it against, a sample of DNA
recovered from a crime scene would only be valuable if there were a suspect in cus-
tody who provided a sample matching the unknown sample. See generally KRAW-
CZAK & SCHMIDTKE, supra note 29, at 93 (acknowledging the limited impact of DNA
evidence in a criminal justice system that does not utilize databases). Therefore, with-
out other evidence at a crime scene that produces a suspect, DNA evidence has little
value. See id.
75. See INMAN & RUDIN, supra note 22, at 133.
76. See id. at 134. While DNA databases store the computerized DNA profile of
an individual, the genetic samples from which the profiles are derived are often also
kept in storage for future analysis. See Jean M. McEwen, DNA Databanks, in GE-
NETIC SECRETS 231 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 1997).
77. See DEPARTMENT ANALYSIS, supra note 31, at 25. This process is inherently
similar to the one currently used to track latent fingerprints. See INMAN & RUDIN,
supra note 22, at 133. The Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) con-
tains millions of citizens' fingerprints on computer file. See id. Fingerprints, like
DNA, are unique to the individual and do not change over the course of one's life.
See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 29, at 57. Prints dusted at crime
scenes can, therefore, be compared with those in the system to generate suspects or
lead to convictions. See id.
78. See INMAN & RUDIN, supra note 22, at 134.
79. See id.
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1. Current State Laws on Criminal DNA Databases
As of June 1998, all fifty states have passed legislation to create
state DNA databases."' Generally, these laws require designated
offenders to provide a genetic sample 81 for inclusion in the state
DNA bank.82 States usually cite the assistance of law enforcement
in identification and detection or exclusion of individuals under
criminal investigation as the main purpose of database legislation.83
The scope of criminals included in DNA databases varies from
state to state. Most statutes simply require a DNA sample from
persons convicted of sex offenses and violent felonies.84 Mean-
80. See ALA. CODE § 36-18-20 (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 44.41.035 (Michie 1996);
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-281 (1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-1101 (Michie
1994); CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.2 (West 1994); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-2-
201(5)(g)(I) (West 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102g (West 1994); DEL. CODE
ArN. tit. 29, § 4713 (1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.325 (West 1994); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 24-4-60 (1992); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 706-603 (Michie 1992); IDAHO CODE § 19-
5504 (1996); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-13 (West 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 10-1-
9-8 (West 1996); IowA CODE ANN. § 13.10 (West 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2511
(1991); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.170 (Banks-Baldwin 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 15:605 (West 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1573 (West 1996); MD. CODE
ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-915 (1994); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 22E, § 3 (Law.
Co-op. 1997); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520m (West 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 299C.155 (West 1993); Miss. CODE ANN. § 45-33-15 (1995); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 650.050 (West 1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 44-6-102 (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-
4104 (1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 176.0913 (Michie 1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 632-A:22 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 53:1-20.17 (West 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-
16-2 (Michie 1997); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 995 (McKinney 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
266 (1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-13-05 (1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.07
(West 1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 584 (West 1996); OR. REV. STAT. § 181.085
(1998); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7651.302 (West 1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-1.5-4
(1998); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-600 (Law. Co-op. 1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23-5-
14 (Michie 1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 38-6-113 (1991); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN.
§ 411.141 (West 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-10-406 (1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20,
§ 1931 (1998); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.2 (Michie 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 43.43.752 (West 1990); W. VA. CODE § 15-2B-1 (1995); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 165.77
(West 1993); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7-19-402 (Michie 1997).
81. Some states require a blood sample for testing. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 706-603(b) (Michie 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 584.A.2 (West 1996);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.325(1)(a) (West 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4-60 (1992); N.Y.
EXEC. LAW § 995-7 (McKinney 1994). Others, alternatively, call for a saliva swab.
See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2511(a)(1991); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-1103(7)
(Michie 1994).
82. See McEwen, supra note 76, at 232.
83. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-1103(2) (Michie 1994); ALASKA STAT.
§ 44.41.035(a) (Michie 1996); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.175(2) (Banks-Baldwin
1992).
84. See, e.g., HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 706-603(3) (Michie 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-2511(a) (1991); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-1103(10-11) (Michie 1994); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 53:1-20.20(a) (West 1994); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 995-c.3. (McKinney 1994).
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while, other states have increased the legislative scope to include
persons convicted of any felony. 5
2. National DNA Database Policy
The federal government also has taken steps in conjunction with
states to apply technology to national criminal investigations. The
DNA Identification Act of 199486 authorized the FBI to establish
the Combined DNA Index System ("CODIS").87 CODIS is a
three-tiered 88 computer system used to facilitate the exchange of
DNA profile information across the nation.89 The national tier of
the CODIS network, the National DNA Index System ("NDIS"),
is "a repository for DNA profiles submitted by participating states.
The NDIS allows states to exchange DNA profiles and perform
inter-state [searches]." 9 To aid in administration, DNA profiles
are stored in three indices: convicted offenders, unknown suspects
and a population file used for statistical purposes. 91 States there-
fore are not limited to their own databases, and can search more
effectively for suspects who cross state lines.92
85. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.2 (Michie 1993); W. VA. CODE § 15-2B-1
(1995).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 14131 (1994).
87. See id. § 14132.
88. CODIS' three hierarchical levels include local, state and national tiers. See
What's the Difference Between NDIS and CODIS (visited Jan 20, 1999) <http://
www.fbi.gov/pressrel/diff> [hereinafter FBI Release]. All three contain DNA
profiles, but each are flexible to meet the specific legislative or technical needs of
state and local enforcement agencies. See id. The Local DNA Index System (LDIS)
is "installed at crime laboratories operated by police departments or sheriff's offices.
All DNA profiles originate at the local level, then flow to the state and national
levels." Id. The State DNA Index System ("SDIS"), "allows laboratories within a
state to exchange DNA profiles. The SDIS is also the communications path between
the local and national tiers. The SDIS is typically operated by the agency responsible
for implementing as a state convicted offender statute." Id.
89. See McEwen, supra note 76, at 233.
90. FBI Release, supra note 88.
91. See Howard Safir, Remarks to the Students of Bronx High School of Science
(Dec. 14, 1998) at 9-10 (transcript on file with Fordham Urban Law Journal) [herein-
after Safir's Plan].
92. See McEwen, supra note 76, at 233. For example, in December 1997, within
minutes of networking eight states into CODIS, a perpetrator in a 1989 Wisconsin
rape and attempted murder was identified as a convicted Illinois sex offender. See
Safir's Plan, supra note 91, at 10. Also, by September 1996, databases accounted for
matching 58 profiles where unknown DNA from a crime scene was found to be the
same as a criminal profile of a known offender in another state. See McEwen, supra
note 76, at 233.
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3. More Intrusive DNA Databases
The theory behind more expansive databases, storing the profiles
of all those arrested, is not an unprecedented concept. Great Brit-
ain currently permits its law enforcement officials to collect non-
intimate samples, such as hair and saliva, from all individuals ar-
rested for a recordable offense.9 3
The British system, operational since April 1995, has met with
resounding investigative success.94 Approximately 135,000 samples
were collected within the system's first year95 and 463,000 samples
currently are included. 96 To date, over 38,000 suspect to crime
matches have been obtained in investigations, with a success rate of
three to five hundred matches per week.97 Over the last five years,
40,000 crimes have been solved with the help of DNA database
profiles and more than 51,000 suspects have been exonerated.98
Additionally, over 6,000 links have been made between separate
crime scenes, proving crimes were being committed by the same
individual. 99 These statistics exemplify the investigative benefits
offered by an expansive DNA database.
D. Safir's Proposal
On December 14, 1998, New York City Police Commissioner
Howard Safir launched a bold campaign to widen the scope of New
York's compulsory DNA statute to encompass aspects of Great
Britain's system.100 Safir's plan calls for the universal DNA testing
93. See Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, Pt. IV, § 55 (1994) (Eng.). The
samples taken include non-intimate tissue such as hair or saliva. Louisiana also au-
thorized a similar system to begin in the Fall of 1999. See Eric Fettmann, Isn't Crime
the Worst Privacy Invasion of Al1?, N.Y. POST, Dec. 20, 1998, at 81.
94. In addition to using its database, Great Britain also practices "Bloodings" in
circumstances where an offender is known to live among a certain population. Law
enforcement officials will collect blood from every person in the area to ferret out the
guilty. See Scheck Transcript, supra note 15, at 42. Such DNA samples, however, are
not placed into the State databank. See id.
95. See McEwen, supra note 76, at 236.
96. See Scheck Transcript, supra note 15, at 45.
97. See Safir's Plan, supra note 91, at 13. The greatest number of hits in a week
was over 1000. See Scheck Transcript, supra note 15, at 47.
98. See Today: Police Commissioner Howard Safir and Norman Siegel of New
York Civil Liberties Union Debate Proposed Policy of Taking DNA Sample and Other
Tests on Everyone Arrested in New York City (NBC television broadcast, Dec. 15,
1998) [hereinafter Today Debate] (quoting Safir's comments on Great Britain's inves-
tigation success).
99. See Fettmann, supra note 93, at 81.
100. Safir introduced the initiative for the first time while addressing the students
of the Bronx High School of Science. See Safir's Plan, supra note 91, at 1.
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of all those arrested so that the individual's DNA can be included
in a DNA database.10' If passed, such an amendment would ex-
pand section 995 of the New York Executive Law,0 2 which cur-
rently permits involuntary DNA samples to be taken from
designated offenders for inclusion into a statewide database. 3
This DNA database includes DNA identification information from
persons convicted of assault, homicide and certain sex offenses. 4
In short, Safir's plan is to begin taking DNA samples from all
individuals arrested for a recordable offense, as opposed to limiting
testing to designated offenders under section 995.105 Under the
proposal, police would swab a suspect's mouth for about thirty
seconds to collect DNA present in saliva.' 6 The DNA sample
would then be used to create a computerized DNA profile, which
would then be stored in a statewide database. This information
would aid in suspect identification by matching genetic material
found at crime scenes against a pool of known offenders, similar to
the method currently employed in matching latent fingerprints
against criminal records. 0 7 According to Safir, creation of a uni-
versal DNA database will enable police to narrow the field of pos-
sible suspects in a crime more quickly (exposing the guilty and
exonerating the innocent), efficiently arrest repeat offenders and
save costs.
10 8
Meanwhile, Safir assures steps would be taken to minimize the
risk of abuse of the collected specimens. 10 9 First, the computerized
DNA profile would be expunged and the DNA sample destroyed
upon acquittal or pardon of an offense. 10 Second, access to the
database would be limited so the information could not be misap-
101. See id.
102. See N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 995 (McKinney 1994).
103. See id. § 995-c.3.
104. See id. § 995.7.; see also supra note 1 (detailing specific offenses enumerated
within the statute). This current program covers only eight percent of felony offend-
ers. See Gary Spencer, Action Predicted on Bills on DNA, Ending Parole, N.Y. L.J.,
Feb. 8, 1999, at 7. Blood samples have been taken from about 6000 offenders since
the program began in 1996. See id.
105. See Today Debate, supra note 98. Safir wants to assure the public that unre-
cordable offenses, such as traffic infractions, would not fall within the scope of this
proposal. See id.
106. See Safir's Plan, supra note 91, at 13.
107. See Spencer, supra note 104, at 7.
108. See Safir's Plan, supra note 91, at 14-17.
109. See infra text accompanying notes 204-205.
110. See Safir's Plan, supra note 91, at 13.
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propriated, but instead used exclusively for law enforcement iden-
tification purposes."'
Publicly, Safir's plan has been met with mixed reaction. New
York City mayor Rudolph Giuliani wholly endorses the plan as a
novel, effective law enforcement tool." 2 A number of other politi-
cians likewise support the program, but to varying degrees. 113 For
instance, some would simply prefer to expand the statute to include
DNA from only convicted felons, and not those convicted of all
offenses as Safir suggests."14 On the other hand, some are ada-
mantly opposed to amending the statute altogether." 5
II. Conflict Surrounding Safir's Plan
A. Constitutional Argument Against Safir's Plan
Opponents of DNA extraction for use in a universal database
argue that the procedure violates the Fourth Amendment guaran-
tee against unreasonable searches and seizures on the grounds that
such bodily searches are conducted in the absence of individualized
suspicion." 6 For instance, Norman Siegel, executive director of the
New York Civil Liberties Union contends that the practice is un-
constitutional because "in order to get DNA under the Fourth
111. See id.
112. See Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani: Celebrating Our Progress in Building a
Safer City, and Moving Forward (WINS Radio Broadcast, Jan. 3, 1999) (visited Jan.
14, 1999) <http://www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/om/htm/99a/me990103.html>. Specifically,
Mayor Giuliani stated:
[A] few weeks ago Police Commissioner Safir called for what we believe can
be another important tool to continue reducing crime in the City: DNA test-
ing. Sampling the DNA of all those who are arrested-through a very simple,
non-invasive procedure that involves briefly placing a swab in the mouth to
collect saliva is essentially a more advanced and more precise form of finger-
printing. In concert with strict privacy protections so that the process cannot
be misused, DNA represents an important new tool in policing that can help
convict the guilty and, equally important, keep the innocent free.
Id.
113. For example, State Senator Roy Goodman hails the proposal as offering a
high-tech crimefighting tool. Senator Goodman states, "This is a better fingerprint.
Call it a throat print. I think it makes all sorts of sense." Tracey Tilly, Dem[ocrat]s
Rip Safir's DNA Plan, Pol[itician]s See 'Police State' Tactic, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec.
16, 1998, at 8.
114. State Senator Dale Volker feels Safir's idea has a more realistic chance of be-
coming law if it limits DNA testing to suspects arrested on felony charges. See Mat-
thew Cox, Cool Response to Safir DNA Plan, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Dec. 16, 1998, at A30.
New York Governor George Pataki plans to propose such an idea alongside Safir's
Plan to the State Assembly. See Spencer, supra note 104, at 7.
115. See infra text accompanying note 117.
116. See Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 305 (4th Cir. 1992); Boling v. Romer, 101
F.3d 1336, 1338 (10th Cir. 1996); State v. Olivas, 856 P.2d 1076, 1081 (1993).
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Amendment, [the government] would have to show that the gath-
ering of the DNA is relevant to the crime. That means that [the
government has] to show that there was blood, semen, [or] saliva at
the crime scene in order to make the match." '117 Proponents of
such plans, however, observe that if individualized suspicion must
exist before a suspect is required to submit a sample, an effective
DNA database would be impossible to implement. 8 DNA
databases refute the idea of individualized suspicion because the
collection of samples is intended to "solve future cases for which
no present suspicion can exist."'1 9
1. The Fourth Amendment Standard
The primary function of the Fourth Amendment is to ensure a
citizen's personal privacy against unwarranted State intrusions.'
Specifically, the Fourth Amendment reads, in pertinent part: "The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
... particularly describing the place to be searched, and the per-
sons or things to be seized." '12 This federal guarantee also prohib-
its unreasonable searches and seizures conducted by state officers
via the Fourteenth Amendment. 22 To prove an action violates
Fourth Amendment rights, therefore, one must first show that the
government action constituted a search, then prove it lacked the
requisite amount of reasonableness.
2. The Search Requirement
Implication of Fourth Amendment protection first requires the
determination of whether a government official's action constitutes
a search. 23 In Katz v. United States,124 the Supreme Court intro-
117. Today Debate, supra note 98.
118. See Jones, 962 F.2d at 305.
119. Id.
120. See United States v. Martinez Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1975); Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
121. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
122. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 334 (1985); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 655 (1961) (holding that "[s]ince the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has
been declared enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth [Amendment], it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of ex-
clusion as is used against the Federal Government").
123. See Hon Charles E. Moylan, Jr., A Conceptualization of the Fourth Amend-
ment, in WILLIAM W. GREENHALGH, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT HANDBOOK, A
CHRONOLOGICAL SURVEY OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONs 6 (1995).
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duced the appropriate standard as to what actiofis constitute a
"search" within the dictates of the Fourth Amendment. 125 The
Court held:
[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home
or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But
what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible
to the public, may be constitutionally protected. 26
In a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan refined the Court's analy-
sis, defining a "search" as a government intrusion into an area
where an individual has a "reasonable expectation of privacy. "127
Given this framework, the Supreme Court has determined the
withdrawal of blood to be a search under the Fourth Amend-
ment. 28 Specifically, in Schmerber v. California,29 the Court de-
finitively stated, "[i]t could not reasonably be argued ... that the
administration of the blood test in this case was free of the con-
straints of the Fourth Amendment. Such testing procedures plainly
constitute searches ... within the meaning of that Amendment."'130
124. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
125. In Katz, FBI agents, without first obtaining a warrant, used electronic eaves-
dropping equipment to record Charles Katz's conversation in a public telephone
booth. Officials recorded Katz's voice as he transmitted wagering information over
the telephone. It was clear the agents violated Katz's Fourth Amendment rights be-
cause they did not obtain a court order for placement of the equipment. The issue,
however, was whether the Fourth Amendment even covered such a situation without
a physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area. See Katz v. United States,
369 F.2d 130 (9th Cir. 1966).
126. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. The Court then found "[t]he Government's activi-
ties in electronically listening to and recording [Katz's] words violated the privacy
upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted
a 'search and seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 353.
127. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
128. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). In Schmerber, the Supreme
Court held a state could withdraw blood from a motorist suspected of drunk driving,
despite his refusal to consent to the search. See id. at 758-59. The Court felt the
action did not violate the motorist's Fourth Amendment rights because the Fourth
Amendment's proper use is to protect only against intrusions that are not justified
under the circumstances or made in an improper manner. See id. at 768. The blood
test was performed properly, "taken by a physician in a hospital environment accord-
ing to accepted medical practices." Id. at 771. The intrusion, meanwhile, was classi-
fied as insignificant since "tests are a commonplace in these days of periodic physical
examination and experience with them teaches that the quality of blood extracted is
minimal, and that for most people the procedure involves virtually no risk, trauma, or
pain." Id.
129. See id. at 757.
130. Id. at 767.
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Since Schmerber, the withdrawal of blood consistently is referred
to as a "search.' 131
Collection and analysis of urine similarly has been deemed a
Fourth Amendment search by the Court.13 2 In Skinner v. Railway
Labor Executives' Ass'n, 33 the Supreme Court announced, "it is
clear that the collection and testing of urine intrudes upon expecta-
tions of privacy that society has long recognized as reasonable...
and.., these intrusions must be deemed searches under the Fourth
Amendment.' 34 Skinner further documents unanimous recogni-
tion of this principle among the Federal Courts of Appeals.135
3. The Reasonableness Requirement
Finding a practice to be a "search" under the Fourth Amend-
ment is only the first step toward setting the standard governing
such intrusions.'36 "The Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all
searches and seizures but only those that are unreasonable.' '1 37
131. See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989)
("We have long recognized that a 'compelled intrusio[n] into the body for blood to be
analyzed for alcohol content' must be deemed a Fourth Amendment search."); Win-
ston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985) (reaffirming the Schmerber analysis); Rise v.
Oregon, 59 F.3d 1156, 1159 (9th Cir. 1995) ("Non-consensual extraction of blood im-
plicated Fourth Amendment privacy rights."); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 306 (4th
Cir. 1992) (noting that "the bodily intrusion resulting from taking a blood sample
constitutes a search within the scope of the Fourth Amendment").
132. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617. In Skinner, the Court upheld the Federal Rail-
road Administration's drug and alcohol tests as constitutional. See id. at 634. The
Court concluded the testing was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment even in the
absence of a search warrant or reasonable suspicion of any particular employee due to
the compelling government interest served by the mandate, which outweighed the
voiced privacy concerns. See id.
133. See id. at 602.
134. Id. at 617.
135. See id. (citing, for example, Lovvorn v. Chattanooga, 846 F.2d 1539, 1542 (6th
Cir. 1988); Copeland v. Philadelphia Police Dep't, 840 F.2d 1139, 1143 (3d Cir. 1988);
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 176 (5th Cir. 1987)).
136. See id., at 618-19; New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985).
137. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (citing United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682
(1985)); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768 (1966). This reasonableness re-
quirement arises from the Constitutional language itself. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
(guaranteeing security against "unreasonable searches and seizures"). Schmerber also
articulately stresses the need for a reasonable search:
[T]he Fourth Amendment's proper function is to constrain, not against all
intrusions as such, but against intrusions which are not justified in the cir-
cumstances, or which are made in an improper manner. In other words, the
question[ ] we must decide in this case [is] ... whether the means and proce-
dures employed in [the search] respected relevant Fourth Amendment stan-
dards of reasonableness.
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768.
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Reasonableness "depends on all of the circumstances surrounding
the search or seizure and the nature of the search or seizure it-
self. ' 138 Therefore, the viability of a search "'is judged by balanc-
ing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests
against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.' ,139
The Skinner4 ° Court recognized that in most criminal cases the
aforementioned balance is struck by requiring a search warrant in
the Fourth Amendment.' 4' When non-consensual extraction of
bodily fluids is performed without a warrant or individualized sus-
picion, the Court demands that the state have "'special needs' be-
yond normal law enforcement that may justify departures from the
usual warrant and probable-cause requirements." '142 Specifically,
the Court stressed:
[A] showing of individualized suspicion is not a constitutional
floor, below which a search must be presumed unreasonable. In
limited circumstances, where the privacy interests implicated by
the search are minimal, and where an important government in-
terest furthered by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by
a requirement of individualized suspicion, a search may be rea-
sonable despite the absence of such suspicion. 143
B. Potential for Misuse of Obtained Information
In addition to the documented constitutional arguments,'144 op-
ponents of DNA databanking also highlight the serious risk of
abusing the vast amount of information available in an individual's
138. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985); T.L.O., 469
U.S. at 337 ("[W]hat is reasonable depends on the context within which a search takes
place.").
139. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654
(1979)); see also, T.L.O. 469 U.S. at 337; Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979);
Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 305 (4th Cir. 1992).
140. 489 U.S. at 602.
141. See id. at 619.
142. Id. at 620 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74 (1987)). See
supra note 132 (summarizing Skinner). The Court stated the scrutinized regulation
furthered the government's special need to prevent accidents and casualties in rail-
road operations that result from railroad employees under the influence of drugs or
alcohol. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620-21. Once this "special need" for testing was
found, the Court concluded the warrant requirement in this case would not further
traditional purposes of a warrant because drugs and alcohol dissipate quickly from the
body. See id. at 623. Requiring a warrant would, therefore, frustrate the govern-
ment's interest in the search. See id.
143. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624.
144. See supra text accompanying note 116.
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DNA.145 The DNA of an individual, serving as the human code, 46
is a virtual blueprint of genetic make-up that carries a map of that
person's biological past and future. 147 Opponents cite numerous
instances where such information, when misappropriated, can be
used for nefarious purposes. 148 For instance, some are concerned
that employers would use private genetic information in a discrimi-
natory manner. 149 Also, there is a fear that insurance companies
might use the information of disease propensity to raise health in-
surance premiums or deny coverage altogether. 50 Even the gov-
ernment is cited as a potential candidate for misappropriation of
the information. 151 These arguments are further supplemented by
Justice Brennan's152 concurrence in Whalen v. Roe, 153 stating pro-
145. See C. Teddy Li, Boling v. Romer: Federal Courts Condone Forced Withdrawal
of Blood for DNA Databanks Despite Constitutional Concerns, 1 J. HEALTH CARE L.
& POL'y 421, 431 (1998) (citing Yale H. Yee, Note, Criminal DNA Databanks:
Revolution for Law Enforcement or Threat to Individual Privacy?, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L.
461, 462 (1995)).
146. See id.
147. See Karen Ann Jensen, Note, Genetic Privacy in Washington State: Policy
Considerations and a Model Genetic Privacy Act, 21 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 357, 359-60
(1997). This commentary utilizes the term "future diary", which is applicable to the
instant contentions. See id. at 360. Acknowledging a diary contains past information
of a personal and private nature, genetic information stored in DNA can be called a
"future diary" because it carries information about future health. See id.
148. See Fettmann, supra note 93, at 81.
149. See Kathy Day, Genetic Testing Leads to Discrimination Questions, SAN Di-
EGO DAILY TRANSCRIPT, Aug. 4, 1992, at 1 (raising the issue of whether employers
who possess knowledge of an individual's high susceptibility to an occupational dis-
ease would deny a job); see also Michael Kirby, Genetic Testing and Discrimination:
The Development of Genetic Testing Confronts Humanity with Urgent Challenges,
UNESCO COURIER, May 1, 1998, at 29 (stressing that an employer's desire to know
of a worker's disease susceptibility in light of potential costs such as disability bene-
fits, sick leave and replacement pay).
150. See Kirby, supra, note 149, at 29. Insurance in the past was relatively fixed by
analyzing the risks of the "onset of a multitude of genetic disorders amongst all mem-
bers of the insuring public." Id. Kirby argues that now the insurance company will
gain an upper hand in offering higher premiums or flatly denying coverage because of
the availability of particular genetic information of inherited orders. See id. Insurers
merely argue they should be able to obtain such information because it is merely
"substituting the latest scientific information for the old-fashioned medical check-ups
and replacing generalized data of life expectancy with accurate predictive data of ge-
netic disorders." Id.
151. See George J. Annas, Privacy Rules for DNA Databanks: Protecting Coded
'Future Diaries', 270 JAMA 2346, 2348 (1993). Annas envisions law enforcement or
child protection agencies using DNA information to ensure parents of children with
inherent genetic conditions are providing proper medical care. See id.
152. See id. at 2346.
153. 429 U.S. 589 (1977). This case concerned an action brought by physicians and
patients challenging a New York statute requiring the state to be provided with a copy
of a prescription for certain drugs. See id. The Court held the statute to be a reason-
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phetically: "The central storage and easy accessibility of computer-
ized data vastly increase the potential for abuse of that
information, and I am not prepared to say that future develop-
ments will not demonstrate the necessity of some curb on such
technology."' 54
While "genetic redlining' 1 55 may be easy to dismiss as an alarm-
ist or extremist reaction, 56 a simple look at American genetic prac-
tices over the last century illustrate why there is a cause for
concern. During the 1920s, for example, strong judicial support
was lent to the eugenics movement, calling for sterilization of citi-
zens deemed undesirable. 57 Specifically, the Supreme Court up-
held a Virginia statute compelling sterilization for those judged to
be "manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.'1 58
Evidence of genetic redlining is not so dated, however. In fact,
during the 1970s, states enacted legislation to identify carriers of
the sickle cell anemia gene to discourage them from bearing chil-
dren.159 African-Americans, as the primary carriers of the gene,
immediately felt discriminatory repercussions in the form of de-
creased job opportunities and higher insurance premiums. 60
III. Analysis
A. DNA Extraction Under Safir's Plan is a Search Within the
Meaning of the Fourth Amendment
Under the analyses of Schmerber and Skinner, Safir's plan, call-
ing for swabbing an accused's cheek to obtain a saliva sample for
DNA analysis,' 6 ' should be deemed a Fourth Amendment search.
able exercise of the state's broad police power, responding to concerns that drugs
were being appropriated for unlawful use. See id.
154. Id. at 607 (Brennan, J., concurring).
155. "Genetic Redlining" is "differentiated treatment based on apparent or per-
ceived human variation." Janet C. Hoeffel, Note, The Dark Side of DNA Profiling:
Unreliable Scientific Evidence Meets the Criminal Defendant, 42 STAN. L. REV. 465,
534 (1990).
156. See Today Debate, supra note 98. (including Safir's classification of the liberal
view as "alarmist").
157. See Hoeffel, supra note 155, at 534 (citing PHILIP REILLY, GENETICS, LAW AND
SOCIAL POLICY 124 (1977)).
158. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
159. See Hoeffel, supra note 155, at 534.
160. See id. at 534-35; see also Day, supra note 149, at 1 (describing how the identi-
fication of sickle cell anemia carriers led to exclusion of opportunities in the military
from amphibious and flight assignments).
161. See Safir's Plan, supra note 91, at 13.
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Although a relatively new analysis, 62 saliva sampling is favorably
comparable with the testing of blood and urine.163 First, the proce-
dure involves an intrusion reaching "beyond the physical charac-
teristics exposed to the public and into the security of the
person.' '164 Second, a saliva sample can, like blood and urine, pro-
vide significant amounts of genetic identity information. 65 Over
the last decade, courts utilized these factors in asserting that an
oral swabbing procedure, like the one suggested by Safir, impli-
cates the Fourth Amendment. 66 At least one New York Federal
District Court is among those in compliance. 67
B. Safir's Plan is Reasonable
Because saliva extraction can be considered a "search" under the
Fourth Amendment, the next question is whether the practice is
reasonable and can be answered by balancing the intrusion against
the promotion of legitimate government interests. The constitu-
tional challenge to DNA databanks consistently has been over-
ruled through consideration of a number of factors. Limited
privacy rights, strong government interest and minimal bodily in-
trusion each prove the validity of the practice in question.
162. See Henry v. Ryan, 775 F. Supp. 247, 253 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (commenting that
while no court to date had explicitly held saliva extraction to be a Fourth Amendment
search, this court would make the assertion).
163. See Schlicher v. Peters, 103 F.3d 940, 943 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Nicolosi, 885 F. Supp. 50, 55 (E.D.N.Y. 1995); Henry, 775 F. Supp. at 255.
164. Henry, 775 F. Supp. at 253 (citing Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 (1973)).
165. See Nicolosi, 885 F. Supp. at 55.
166. See Shelton v. Gundmanson, 934 F. Supp. 1048, 1050 (W.D. Wis. 1996) (involv-
ing swabbing the inside of an individual's mouth cheek with a sponge-like tooth-
brush); Nicolosi, 885 F. Supp. at 55 (assuming the saliva sample would be obtained by
swabbing the inside of the subject's mouth with a pad of some sort).
167. See Nicolosi, 885 F. Supp. at 55. This case involved a prosecution for sending
threatening communications through the mail in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876. See id.
at 51. The government obtained a "so-ordered" subpoena directing the accused to
provide a saliva sample. See id. The defendant refused, claiming the prosecution
must first obtain a valid search warrant in conformance with the requirements of the
Fourth Amendment. See id. The District Court was asked to decide whether the
Fourth Amendment applied to the ability of the Government to obtain saliva samples.
See id. The court held that, in light of the facts that the search implicated a dignity
interest by swabbing the inside of the defendant's mouth and the sample can provide
a significant amount of genetic information not within the public domain, proper com-
pliance with the Fourth Amendment is necessary. See id. at 55.
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1. Limited Privacy Right Upon Arrest
In Jones v. Murray,168 perhaps the definitive authority on the
constitutionality of body fluid extraction for use in DNA
databases, 169 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded the
DNA testing statute in question did not violate an inmate's Fourth
Amendment privacy right.170 The court reasoned, in part: "prob-
able cause had already supplied the basis for bringing the person
within the criminal justice system. With the person's loss of liberty
upon arrest comes the loss of at least some, if not all, rights to per-
sonal privacy otherwise protected by the Fourth Amendment.' 71
The Supreme Court has recognized this principal in holding both
body cavity searches of prisoners172  and penitentiary cell
searches 73 constitutional. Accordingly, while a free citizen need
not expect such routine searches, that same individual cannot raise
privacy objections upon arrest. 74
2. Strong Government Interest
Upon arrest, a suspect's identification becomes a matter of legiti-
mate state interest, relevant to solving the crime for which the
arrest took place and for establishing a record to aid in solving past
and future crimes. 75 As such, criminals remain willing to take cer-
tain steps to hamper positive identification by law enforcement of-
ficials by disguising faces, changing names or even altering
168. 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1992). This case involved the challenge that a Virginia
statute requiring DNA testing for all felons violated the individual's civil rights. See
id. at 305.
169. See State v. Olivas, 856 P.2d 1076, 1085 (1993) ("Jones v. Murray ... is persua-
sive authority for the proposition that drawing of blood from convicted felons to es-
tablish a DNA data bank for use in future prosecution of recidivist acts does not
violate the Fourth Amendment.").
170. See Jones, 962 F.2d at 311.
171. Id. at 306 (emphasis added).
172. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). In Bell, prisoners in a federal peniten-
tiary questioned the constitutionality of visual body cavity searches in light of their
Fourth Amendment rights. See id. at 558. The Court upheld the searches, concluding
the limited privacy rights of prisoners to be outweighed substantially by the govern-
ments' need for penal security. See id. at 559.
173. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984). In Hudson, an inmate brought an
action against an officer for destruction of his property during a prison cell search.
See id. at 520. In rejecting the prisoner's claim, the Court declared: "[W]e conclude
that prisoners have no legitimate expectation of privacy and that the Fourth Amend-
ment's prohibition on unreasonable searches does not apply in prison cells[.]" Id. at
530.
174. See James P. O'Brien, Jr., Note, DNA Fingerprinting: The Virginia Approach,
35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 767, 801-2 (1994).
175. See Jones, 962 F.2d at 306.
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features.176 As the Jones court reasons, however, DNA databases
can play a pivotal role in aiding officials with legitimate pursuit of
suspect identification:
DNA... is claimed to be unique to each individual and cannot,
within current scientific knowledge, be altered. The individual-
ity of the DNA provides a dramatic new tool for the law en-
forcement effort to match suspects and criminal conduct. Even
a suspect with altered physical features cannot escape the match
that [he] ... left at the scene of a crime within samples of blood,
skin, semen, or hair follicles. The governmental justification,....
therefore, relies on no argument different in kind from that tra-
ditionally advanced for taking fingerprints and photographs, but
with additional force because of the potentially greater precision
of DNA sampling and matching methods.177
Along with the government's interest in identification, deter-
rence of both criminal and harmful actions is also a documented
government interest in DNA databanking. 178 DNA databases can
address this national interest by serving as a significant deterrent
against recidivist activity.179 In theory, those with prior arrests who
previously submitted a DNA sample would be deterred from fu-
ture criminal behavior due to an increase in likelihood of capture
accompanying the strong identification power of DNA evidence. 80
3. Minor Intrusion in DNA Extraction
The bodily intrusion requested under Safir's plan, namely ex-
tracting DNA with a swab of the oral cavity to obtain a saliva sam-
ple,"" must be evaluated -against the aforementioned governmental
interests. In People v. Wealer,8 2 upholding a correctional code
provision for mandatory blood and saliva sampling from state pris-
oners, the court presented a persuasive argument about the intru-
176. See id. at 307.
177. Id.
178. See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 620-21
(1989) (upholding mandatory drug testing of railroad employees because of the im-
portance of preventing harmful accidents and casualties); National Treasury Employ-
ees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (highlighting the need for sober customs
officials to protect national borders from contraband smuggling).
179. See State v. Olivas, 856 P.2d 1076, 1085-86 (1993) (disclosing the rationale be-
hind the Virginia compulsory DNA statute at issue in Jones).
180. Accord O'Brien, supra note 174, at 797 (asserting that "DNA fingerprints on
file ... deter future criminal behavior and ... increase the likelihood of capturing
repeat offenders").
181. See Safir's Plan, supra note 91, at 13.
182. 636 N.E.2d 1129 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
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sive levels of saliva extraction.'83 The Wealer court reasoned the
procedure involved in taking saliva samples is inherently less intru-
sive than that required for extracting blood.1 84 Therefore, if taking
blood samples withstands constitutional scrutiny, taking saliva sam-
ples likewise is reasonable. 185 It thus follows that if blood sampling
no longer is to be considered an overly intrusive procedure, 86 sa-
liva sampling cannot be an inherently violative process either.187
C. Safeguards Can Protect Against Misuse of Information
Learning valuable lessons from the dark moments of genetic red-
lining in American history, legislators may consider several alterna-
tives to ensure DNA information stored in a database will only be
used for the stated purposes.
1. Unambigtuous Legislative Drafting
Clear, unambiguous legislation such as the DNA Identification
Act of 1994,188 is one solution.18 9 This particular federal law pro-
vides that the results of DNA tests performed for a federal law
enforcement agency may be disclosed only to criminal justice agen-
cies for the purpose of law enforcement identification, 9 ° judicial
183. See id. at 1132.
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. See supra note 131, at 771 (chronicling reasons why blood testing is not an
overly intrusive procedure).
187. See Wealer, 636 N.E.2d at 1136. Where blood testing involves actually piercing
skin, a saliva extraction gently swabs the inside of an individual's mouth cheek to gain
the necessary sample. See United States v. Nicolosi, 885 F. Supp. 50, 55 (E.D.N.Y.
1995).
Similarly, an argument can be made that the swabbing procedure is less physically
intrusive than the constitutionally protected fingerprinting process. While swabbing
invades the oral cavity, it is a quick, pain-free action. During fingerprinting, however,
arestees may need to be physically guided to mark the inkpad and print card. Accord
People v. Sallow, 165 N.Y.S. 915, 924 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1917) (acknowledging the consti-
tutionality of the fingerprinting process while stressing the importance of an arestee's
freedom from torture or duress). This ordeal presents a constitutional physical intru-
sion greater than swabbing for saliva.
188. 42 U.S.C. § 14131 (1995).
189. See Annas, supra note 151, at 2349 ("[D]ata protection principles suggest that
there should be... stringent rules for the ... distribution of... information derived
from [DNA molecules] because of the unique characteristics of genetic information,
including the fact that DNA molecules contain an individual's probabilistic future
diary.").
190. 42 U.S.C. § 14133(b)(1)(A).
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proceedings,' 9 ' criminal defense, 92 inclusion in a population statis-
tics database, identification research and protocol development for
quality control. 93 The DNA Identification Act then outlines spe-
cific penalties for unauthorized disclosure of DNA information
available in a federal database and for unauthorized possession of
DNA samples indexed in a database or individually identifiable
DNA information. 194 Violation of any of these mandates may be
punishable with a fine up to 100,000 dollars. 95 States, including
New York, with DNA databank statutes in place have modeled
their legislation to mirror the federal act in this regard.196 In draft-
ing more expansive legislation to replace section 995, New York
could easily pattern the statute to reflect that currently in place. 97
2. Anti-Discrimination Legislation
Anti-discrimination legislation is another alternative to combat
genetic redlining. 198 For example, New York amended its anti-dis-
crimination laws to deem it an unlawful, discriminatory practice for
an employer to refuse employment or to discharge an employee
based on "genetic predisposition or carrier status."'199 The specter
191. Results of DNA tests performed for law enforcement purposes may be dis-
closed in judicial proceedings only if "otherwise admissible pursuant to applicable
statutes or rules." Id. § 14133(b)(1)(B).
192. Id. § 14133(b)(1)(C).
193. Test results may only be used for these three purposes where personal identifi-
able information is removed. See id. § 14133(b)(2).
194. See id. § 14133(c)(1)-(2).
195. See id.
196. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:612, 15:617-18 (West 1999).
197. See N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 995-c.-f. (McKinney 1994). New York law currently
mandates that records in its state DNA index only be released for law enforcement
identification purposes to a federal, state or local law enforcement agency, district
attorney's office, for criminal defense purposes, to a defendant or representative or
for inclusion into a population statistical database, development of identification re-
search and protocol or quality control when personal identifiable information has
been removed. See id. § 995-c.6.(a)-(c). Also, confidentiality requirements stipulate
such information may not be released to "insurance companies, employers, or poten-
tial employers, health providers, employment screening or personnel companies, or
... private investigation services." Id. § 995-d.1. Any person who intentionally dis-
closes a DNA record or results of a DNA test to an unauthorized agency or intention-
ally uses such information for unauthorized purposes is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor and, upon conviction, subject to a fine of up to 10,000 dollars. See id.
§ 995-f.
198. See generally, Michael M.J. Lin, Conferring a Federal Property Right in Genetic
Material; Stepping into the Future with the Genetic Privacy Act, 22 AM. J. L. & MED.
109, 128 (1996).
199. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296.1.(a) (McKinney 1993) (amended 1996); see also, N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12a. (West 1994) (amended 1996) ("It shall be an unlawful employ-
ment practice, or, as the case may be, an unlawful discrimination for an employer,
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of criminal prosecution or civil liability can serve to deter possible
offenders and pacify liberal activists.
3. Manner of Storage
The nature of the DNA information stored in a databank can
also quell the concern for misappropriation of information. Stan-
dard DNA profiles, capable of being stored as a mere numeric
code, will provide little information regarding inherited medical or
physical traits.2° The privacy issues in databanking arise instead
from retention of samples themselves, once identification informa-
tion is entered into the database.2°a These samples are where the
wealth of genetic information is stored because further testing
could be performed on them in the future. 2 2 In light of these pri-
vacy risks, one suggestion for preserving confidentiality more effec-
tively would be to destroy genetic samples after analysis.20 3 Such
an approach would provide law enforcement officials with data
necessary for identification purposes, while addressing the obvious
concerns for abuse of any other readily obtainable information.
Additionally, Safir's plan recognizes the debate surrounding ge-
netic information available in a DNA sample.2° Wanting to avoid
comparisons to a virtual police state, where all citizens' profiles are
available for identification purposes, Safir proposes that an ar-
rested citizen's sample would be destroyed and the DNA profile
erased from the databank once the person is found innocent or
exempt from prosecution.20 5 This practice succeeds in being sensi-
tive to concerns of information misappropriation by taking an af-
firmative step in assuring certain information is unobtainable (via
expungement) to unauthorized parties.
because of . . .genetic information ...[to] refuse to hire or employ or to bar or
discharge ... from employment such individual.").
200. See Paul B. Ferrara, DNA Benefits Outweigh Any Risk, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Feb-
ruary 11, 1999, at A49.
201. See McEwen, supra note 76, at 237.
202. See id.
203. See id. at 238. McEwen, however, questions the feasibility of this approach in
light of a crime lab's need to save samples for reanalysis as technology improves, the
needs of a defendant to challenge the sample itself in a future case or the need for
routine quality control checks. See id. To solve this problem, perhaps, an additional
sample could be recollected at a future date, retested for identification purposes and
subsequently destroyed. See Jensen, supra note 147, at 382.
204. See Safir's Plan, supra note 91, at 13.
205. See id. Under the current New York law, upon reversal of a conviction or
grant of a pardon of an individual whose DNA record has been stored in the state
database, the DNA record is expunged from the index and all samples, analyses and
other documents are destroyed. See N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 995-c.9. (McKinney 1994).
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D. New York City's Need for an Expanded DNA Database
While Safir's plan withstands constitutional scrutiny,2 °6 as well as
questions involving misappropriation,2 °7 the benefits of the practice
for New York City also support passage into legislation.
1. Suspect Identification
Perhaps the greatest benefit an expanded DNA database yields
is the increased number of suspects identifiable under a more in-
clusive law who, under current legislation, are not being profiled.
In his proposal, Safir provides one example of how identification
information becomes more useful under the proposed system.20 8
In examining the last one hundred forcible rape or sodomy cases in
which arrests were made, seventy-five arrestees had prior ar-
rests.20 9 According to Safir, however, "in only eighteen of the cases
did the perpetrator have prior arrests and convictions for crimes
that would place them in . . . [the] convicted offender DNA
database.'21' The logical conclusion, therefore, is that a significant
number of investigations and apprehensions could be conducted
with greater speed and efficiency if New York collected DNA
profiles from all those arrested. l I
A consultation of New York State inmate profiles supports this
assertion.21 2 Across New York State, only 7.9% of inmates had no
prior convictions and only 12.9% had no prior arrests.21 3 These
statistics show an overwhelming majority of inmates serving time
who had prior infractions with the law214 and would therefore have
been eligible for a DNA profile under Safir's plan, perhaps expe-
206. See supra text accompanying notes 161-187.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 188-205.
208. See Safir's Plan, supra note 91, at 15.
209. See id.
210. Id.
211. See id. at 16. Safir then goes on to cite the program in Great Britain as evi-
dence of this theory. See id. Safir states that over an eighteen-month period ending
in October 1998, British law enforcement identified 175 rape suspects, 46 murder sus-
pects and over 19,000 burglary suspects with help from their expansive DNA
database. See id.
212. See STATE OF NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, Divi-
SION OF PROGRAM PLANNING, RESEARCH AND EVALUATION, THE HUB SYSTEM:
PROFILE OF INMATES UNDER CUSTODY ON JANUARY 1, 1998 (1998) [hereinafter 1998
PROFILE].
213. See id. at 32.
214. Statewide, a majority of inmates (69.0%) had either served a prior jail term
(23.8%) or a prior prison term (35.2%) and 20.1% had a prior conviction without jail
or prison. See id. at 32.
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diting the investigation and arrest for each inmate for his or her
criminal commission.
Meanwhile, in light of the total number of inmates under cus-
tody,215 a large percentage of DNA profiles could be taken for use
in future investigations. While those persons serving terms for se-
lect homicides, assaults and sexual offenses are already included in
the state DNA database under current law, a majority of inmates in
New York State prisons are not being profiled.216 Specifically, al-
most a third of inmates (32.8%) are committed for drug offenses,
18.8% for robbery and 5.9% for burglary.217 If each of these of-
fenders were to be profiled under Safir's plan, approximately
40,000 more DNA profiles would be available to law enforcement
statewide to aid in future investigations.21 8
The relevance of these 40,000 additional profiles comes to light
when recidivism rates in New York are provided. While there are
many ways to measure recidivism, it will be defined as the return or
recommitment to New York State Department of Correctional
Services' custody for purposes of this Note.219
Approximately forty-four percent of the inmates released in
1993 were recommitted within three years of their release.22 ° Sta-
215. As of January 1, 1998, there were 69,099 inmates under custody in New York
State. See id. at 2.
216. According to the 1998 Profile, of all those inmates under custody in New York
State currently eligible for inclusion in the state's DNA databank, 9.1% are serving
for Murder, 2.6% for Attempted Murder, 4.6% for Manslaughter, 2.9% for Rape in
the First Degree, 1.9% for Assault in the First Degree, 1.6% for Assault in the Second
Degree, 1.5% for Sodomy in the First Degree and 1.0% for Sodomy in the Second
Degree. See id. at 26.
217. See id. at 25-26. These percentages represent the largest commission statistics,
with others, such as kidnapping, weapons offenses, arson, etc. rounding out the rest of
the prison population. See id.
218. 40,000 represents 57.5% of the 69,099 inmates under custody listed in the 1998
Profile. See id. at 2.
219. See STATE OF NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, Divi-
SION OF PROGRAM PLANNING, RESEARCH AND EVALUATION, 1993 RELEASES:
THREE YEAR POST RELEASE FOLLOW-UP 3 (1997) [hereinafter 1993 RELEASES].
There are several forms of releases such as release of an inmate to a health facility,
parole or completion of sentence. See id. at 1. The 1993 Releases includes only re-
leases on parole and sentence completion. See id. Therefore, readmission to a New
York correctional facility and, thus recidivism, is measured by either parole violation,
occurring when a released inmate violates rules of parole and is returned to prison to
continue serving time on a remaining sentence, or new felony commitment, occurring
when an inmate commits a new crime within the community and receives a new sen-
tence for it. See id. at 4. Essentially, the 1993 Releases provides return to custody
statistics for all inmates released from New York State prisons in 1993 during a three-
year follow-up period. See id. at 1.
220. See id. at 3.
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tistics for return rates of those originally serving time for offenses
not currently covered by section 995 prove the benefits of including
all offenders in a statewide DNA database. 221 For example, the
category defined as "Property and Other Offenses," which includes
inmates committed for Burglary in the Third Degree, Grand Lar-
ceny, Forgery, Stolen Property, Driving While Intoxicated and
other crimes, demonstrated that within three years, fifty percent of
offenders were recommitted for another offense.2 22 Similarly, of
those who served time for drug offenses, forty percent returned.223
Among other current crimes not covered by section 995, "offenses
that demonstrated high return rates were Robbery 3rd (fifty-six
percent), Burglary 3rd (fifty-five percent), Stolen Property (fifty-
two percent) and Grand Larceny (fifty-one percent). 224
Indeed, these numbers suggest a striking trend: the same indi-
viduals constantly are being recycled through New York's prisons
for repeat offenses. If DNA samples were taken from all arrestees,
these individuals' computerized profiles would be included upon
their first sentence. While obviously not helpful in all investiga-
tions, DNA database profiles would be immensely helpful in those
investigations which include genetic samples left behind at crime
scenes. Because many of the same individuals are recommitting
crimes, proliferation of this investigative tool can help ease the bur-
den on police, thereby reducing the time and cost of investigations.
2. Maintaining New York City's Low Level of Crime
Over the past decade, New York City has undergone a social
renaissance, transforming itself into an inherently safer metropo-
221. Interestingly, homicide releases, currently covered by section 995, demon-
strated one of the lowest recidivism rates. See id. at 16. Of 176,991 inmates released
during 1985-1993, 6399 had been committed for a homicide offense (Murder, At-
tempted Murder, Manslaughter and all other Homicide offenses), only 25% returned
to prison within three years. See id. "Approximately 9% of those released with homi-
cide offenses returned as new court commitment; only 6% returned for a new homi-
cide offense." Id. Similarly, sex offenders (i.e. Rape, Sodomy, Sexual Abuse and all
other Sex Crimes), covered under section 995, returned 33% within three years, an-
other lower return rate. See id. at 18. "Of the sex offenders who returned to prison
for the commission of new crime, 25% returned for the commission of another sex
offense, 19% returned for a drug offense, and 17% returned for robbery." Id.
222. See id. at 11.
223. See id.
224. Id. at 10. Offenses currently included under section 995 showed comparable
percentages, but represented a smaller number of inmates. For example, where Rape
in the First Degree had a 46.8% return rate, 124 violators out of 265 were recommit-
ted. See id. at 11. Comparatively, Robbery in the First Degree, with a 46.2% return
rate, represents the return of 995 out of 2217 violators. See id.
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lis. 225 A brief consultation of crime rate statistics over this period
lends weight to this assertion. For example, in 1998, only 628 homi-
cides were reported in New York City,226 less than a third of the
number of homicides in 1990, when a record 2262 were commit-
ted.227 Overall, major crimes in the city dropped approximately
eleven percent from 1997, with the most drastic declines recorded
in homicides, down nineteen percent, and car thefts, which
dropped fifteen percent. 228 Also, in 1998, "[t]here were fewer re-
ported robberies, assaults, burglaries, grand larcenies and car
thefts, and - despite early indications that the drop in rape was
leveling off - [there has been an] 11 percent . . . [drop in]
rapes. "229
Criminologists debate the causes of the consistent and dramatic
drop in New York City's crime rates. Some cite factors such as the
booming economy, the drop in the number of people in their late
teens and early twenties, the decline of drug use and the increase of
incarceration as reasons for the decline.23° Others even suggest
that the current generation of teens witnessed first hand the effect
of lawlessness on their families and have become weary of its
costs.
231
One factor resulting in the dramatic crime rate drop, however,
can be found in the aggressive policing of New York City's popu-
lace.232 Among other implemented strategies, the move away from
community policing, calling for officers to simply walk neighbor-
hood beats, towards utilizing modern technology to fight crime has
225. See David Kocieniewski, Murders Drop 25% as Violent City Crime Falls Again,
N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1998, at B3 (quoting Mayor Rudolph Giuliani's characterization:
"Over the past four years, New York City has been transformed from the crime capi-
tal of the world to the safest large city in the United States").
226. See Micheal Cooper, Chicago Logs More Killing than New York City in '98,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1999, at B3 (observing that New York City, with an estimated 7.3
million population logged 69 less homicides than did Chicago, a city with a 2.7 million
population).
227. See Micheal Cooper, Homicides Decline Below 1964 Level in New York City,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1998, at Al (stating homicide levels today are the lowest since
1964, when 636 homicides were reported).
228. See id.
229. Id. Between 1990 and 1997, the total number of felony convictions has de-
creased 19.1%. See Division of Criminal Justice Services, Criminal Justice Indicators
by Percent Change, New York City: 1990-1997 (visited Jan. 10, 1999) <http:/I
criminaljustice.state.ny.us>.
230. See id.
231. See David Kocieniewski, Crime in City Down in '97 by 9.1 Percent, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 3, 1998, at B1. Kocieniewski refers to this reason as the "little brother factor."
Id.
232. See Kocieniewski, Murders, supra note 225, at B3.
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been very helpful in lowering crime.233 Moreover, Mayor Giu-
liani's constant call for a proliferated police force,3 the devotion
of police resources to an anti-drug campaign,235 and the work of
the department's street crime unit 236 each play a role in addressing
criminal problems.
The expansion of New York's DNA database is another aggres-
sive police tactic that can help keep crime rates in New York City
at these low levels. While some would question the allocation of
funds toward more policing,237 expansion of law enforcement tac-
tics and crime reduction play too crucial a role in New York City's
revitalization, from the growth in tourism to "the impressionistic
sense that residents feel better about their hometown. ' 238 Plans to
increase police efficiency, such as Safir's plan, cannot be dismissed
because the city can not lose its momentum if there is an expecta-
tion to drive down crime.239
Meanwhile,' due to the investigative efficiency posed by Safir's
plan, costs associated with lengthy police investigations (such as in-
terviewing multiple suspects, attempts to uncover inculpatory evi-
dence and preparing eyewitnesses for prosecution) would
drastically decrease, as a profile match in a database would prove
highly probative in either exonerating the innocent or convicting
the guilty.24° Cost and time aside, a review of the success of a simi-
lar program in Great Britain241 proves the effects of the practice on
crime fighting, showing the strategy would aid in maintaining (or
bettering) the low crime rate existing in New York City today.
233. For example, police are using computer maps to chart crimes and assign of-
ficers where they will be used most effectively throughout the five boroughs. See
Cooper, Homicides, supra note 227, at Al.
234. The size of the New York City police force has swelled to nearly 40,000 of-
ficers. See Kocieniewski, Murders, supra note 225, at B3.
235. The anti-drug initiative seeks to exile narcotics dealers from neighborhoods by
saturating high-crime areas with law enforcement officials. See id.
236. This police unit seizes illegal weapons, helping to reduce the number of shoot-
ings from 2500 in the first half of 1993 to fewer than 1000 in the first half of 1998. See
id.
237. For example, Peter F. Vallone, the Speaker of the City Council, and Glenn
Passman, the Associate Director of the Public Policy Organization, City Project, ques-
tion whether the Mayor is already doing too much with law enforcement at the ex-
pense of other city services such as education, health care and social services. See
Dan Barry, Mayor Says Adding Officers is Key to City's Health, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29,
1999, at B10.
238. Id.
239. See id. (quoting Eli Silverman, a professor at John Jay College of Criminal
Justice).
240. See Safir's Plan, supra note 91, at 15.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 93-99.
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3. Backlog Caveat W
While the positive logical effects of an expanded DNA database
are apparent, one prevalent administrative issue must be addressed
before New York can seriously consider putting Safir's plan into
action. That problem is state DNA laboratories lack the funds, fa-
cilities and personnel to type enough cases. Consequently, a signif-
icant backlog results, even under the current, less expansive, DNA
collection statute. 42
According to Professor Barry C. Scheck,243 the backlog results
from samples that have been collected but not profiled due to
sheer volume. 2 " Similarly, New York has a significant number of
rape kits from unsolved sexual crimes that include genetic samples
that have not been profiled and checked against the state
databank.245 Yet another problem resulting from the overload is
the large number of owed samples that have yet to be collected
from convicted felons under the current statute because they are
out on parole.246
The effects of backlog in New York are numerous. Databases
are not being utilized to their full investigative advantage because
they are not being kept current. 47 Even when labs are able to ana-
lyze a profile, it takes months to produce results,248 by which time a
suspect may already be awaiting trial, thereby creating unnecessary
expenses for the judicial system 249 and overall injustice to the de-
242. See Barry C. Scheck, Getting Smart About DNA (US Does Not Use DNA Tech-
nology to Full Advantage), NEWSWEEK 69 Nov. 16, 1998; Mike Pezzella, FBI DNA
Dragnet to Track Fugitives in 50 States, BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWSWATCH, Oct. 19, 1998,
at 1. Nationally, over 450,000 samples exist at crime laboratories that have not yet
been analyzed. See Kendall Anderson, Panel Debates Taking DNA Upon Arrest;
Some at Dallas Meeting Say Samples Backlogged, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
March 2, 1999, at 13A.
243. Barry C. Scheck is a law professor and co-director of the Innocence Project at
the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law in New York City. See Scheck, DNA, supra
note 242, at 69. The Innocence Project utilizes DNA testing to aid in defending in-
mates wrongfully convicted of crimes. See id. Professor Scheck is also a commis-
sioner on New York's Forensic Science Review Board, which created and maintains
the state's DNA databank. See id.
244. See Scheck Transcript, supra note 15, at 54.
245. Professor Scheck estimates there are approximately 10,000 such kits in New
York, which were formerly being thrown away before a change in policy. See id. at 59.
246. See id. at 56.
247. See id. at 54.
248. See Scheck Transcript, supra note 15, at 62; see also Cellmark to Use New DNA
Test to Link Criminals to Unsolved Crimes, PR NEWSWIRE, Feb. 15, 1999.
249. "[D]efendants are likely to plead guilty quickly after getting bad DNA re-
sults." Cellmark, supra note 248.
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tained.25° Comparatively, the British, who have made the invest-
ment in sufficient personnel and facilities, are able to profile their
crime scene DNA within two weeks because they do not have
backlog problems. 251
The solution to the problem of backlog simply would be to fund
the state laboratories so that they are able to efficiently transform
incoming evidence into computerized profiles, as well as eliminate
the current backlog at these labs. 2  In a recent budget proposal,
President Clinton set aside federal funds to aid anti-crime initia-
tives.253 Recognizing the backlog issue, the proposal allots fifteen
million dollars to eliminate over one million backlogged convicted
offender DNA samples at state laboratories.25 4 When these old
samples are digitized, states can allocate funds to provide facilities
and personnel to handle the volumes of incoming samples and thus
prevent future backlog.
Conclusion
The ability to store the genetic records of criminals in a database
is an invaluable tool when used for law enforcement identification
purposes. Such a technique, however, is not used to its utmost po-
tential when only selected criminals are included in the database.
The implementation of a system where DNA is taken from all
those arrested for inclusion in a statewide DNA database would
strengthen the fight against crime in New York by detering recidi-
vism, assisting in maintaining record low crime rates and easing in-
vestigative burdens on law enforcement agencies.
The proposed system, in light of inherent government interest in
crime fighting, does not violate an arrestee's privacy rights.
Although steps first should be taken to address the misappropria-
tion of information and backlog, the New York State Legislature
should adopt Safir's plan into law because of its potential as an
invaluable law enforcement tool.
250. "[I]ndigent defendants, unable to make bail, spend time in jail for crimes they
did not commit." Id.
251. See id.; See also Scheck Transcript, supra note 15, at 62.
252. See Scheck, DNA, supra note 242, at 69; see also Anderson, supra note 242, at
13A.
253. See Juan Otero, Clinton Focuses Funds on Anti-Crime Initiatives, NATION'S
CITIES WKLY. Feb. 8, 1999, at 13.
254. See id.
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